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Abstract 
 
Corn production is scattered geographically over various continents, but most of it is grown in the 
United States. As such, the world price of corn futures contracts is largely dominated by North 
American corn prices as traded on the Chicago Board of Trade. In recent years, this market has been 
characterised by an increase in price volatility and magnitude of price movement as a result of 
decreasing stock levels. The development and implementation of an effective and successful derivative 
price risk management strategy based on the Chicago Board of Trade corn futures contract will 
therefore be of inestimable value to market stakeholders worldwide. 
The research focused on the efficient market hypothesis and the possibility of contesting this 
phenomenon through an application of a derivative price risk management methodology. The 
methodology is based on a combination of an analysis of market trends and technical oscillators with 
the objective of generating returns superior to that of a market benchmark. 
The study found that market participants are currently unable to exploit price movement in a manner 
which results in returns that contest the notion of efficient markets. The methodology proposed, 
however, does allow the user to consistently achieve returns superior to that of a predetermined 
market benchmark. The benchmark price for the purposes of this study was the average price offered 
by the market over the contract lifetime, and as such, the efficient market hypothesis was successfully 
contested. 
 
Keywords: Trading Signals, Price Risk, Effectiveness, Corn Market 
 
*University of South Africa, PO Box 1187, Welkom, South Africa, 9460 
Tel: +27 57 391 1903 
Email: 7werner.rossouw@gmail.com 
** University of South Africa, PO Box 52 185, Wierda Park, Centurion, Pretoria, South Africa, 0149 
Tel: 27 12 429 3725 
Fax: 27 12 429 3552 
Email: youngj@unisa.ac.za 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Worldwide, roughly 829 million tons of corn is 
produced on an annual basis of which the bulk is 
grown in the United States (USDA 2012). The world 
price of corn is consequently determined to a large 
extent by North American corn prices. Ever since the 
inception of the Chicago Board of Trade (otherwise 
known as CBOT) in 1848, participants in the 
agricultural soft commodities market have had to 
adapt to a challenging and volatile futures market 
highlighted by extreme price movements.  
According to Irwin and Good (2009), compelling 
evidence exists that the CBOT corn futures contract is 
on the brink of a new era of exceptional high volatility 
with increased uncertainty regarding the future price 
levels of corn futures contracts. The probable 
magnitude and volatility of future corn price 
movements are highlighted by reference to the shift in 
nominal prices during two previous periods. Irwin and 
Good identifies the first period as being from 1947 to 
1972, a period characterised by the suspension of price 
controls, while the second period from 1972 to 2006 is 
known as a period of escalating energy prices and 
rapid inflation. The average monthly corn price 
increase between these periods was close to 89%.  
Another structural change in corn prices occurred 
in 2006, resulting in the start of a new period of 
escalating commodity prices. Whereas the price of 
corn was previously determined by its feeding value to 
livestock, ethanol production currently explains 90% 
of all corn price fluctuations (Good, Hieronymus & 
Hinton 1980). In addition, Trostle (2008) states that 
the growth in demand from developing nations 
coupled with the current US monetary policy will 
result in a further surge in prices. These structural 
shifts in nominal prices, coupled with ever-increasing 
levels of volatility, comprise the least manageable 
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factor threatening the existence of market participants 
and have stressed producers, processors and 
speculators literally beyond the breaking point 
(Nivens, Kastens & Dhuyvetter 2002). Uncertainty 
regarding the most appropriate and effective hedging 
and/or speculative methodology to be implemented 
under ever-changing technical and fundamental 
market conditions remains the single biggest 
shortcoming of market participants in their effort to 
mitigate price risks inherent in the futures market 
successfully.  
In this paper the price-risk management 
performance from strategies, as implemented by 
stakeholders in the futures market, was identified and 
the returns achieved compared against a relevant 
benchmark. In addition, a structured approach to 
price-risk management was investigated through the 
identification of specific market trends. Trading 
signals were derived from the trends identified, 
resulting in the development of a trading methodology 
and the consequent comparison of returns achieved 
against a predetermined market benchmark. 
 
2 Aim 
 
This paper aims to identify the success by which 
participants in the soft commodity futures market 
mitigate the risk of price movement and volatility of 
corn futures contracts through the use of exchange-
traded derivative instruments. As a result of thorough 
technical- and market price analysis, a derivative 
trading methodology will be developed. This 
methodology will be based on trading signals and 
market trends identified by means of the analysis 
applied on price data. The subsequent returns achieved 
by the proposed methodology will be benchmarked 
against the return offered by the market. Successful 
price-risk mitigation with returns superior to that 
offered by the market will contest the efficient market 
hypothesis and could serve as motivation for the 
development of similar risk management strategies 
with the objective of achieving superior returns. 
 
3 Scope 
 
This paper is divided into the following topics: 
 Theoretical background on derivative 
instruments. 
 Price-risk management performance of 
stakeholders in the corn futures market. 
 Background and application of proposed risk 
management methodology. 
 Evaluation of proposed price risk 
management methodology versus benchmark. 
 
4 Theoretical background on derivative 
instruments 
 
A broad explanation from Bodie, Kane and Marcus 
(2002:980) states that a derivative is a tool “… 
providing payoffs that depend on or are contingent on 
the values of other assets such as commodity prices, 
bond and stock prices, or market index values”. 
According to the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) (2006), all derivative instruments 
encompass the following three characteristics, namely: 
 their value fluctuate in accordance with 
changes in a specified interest rate, commodity price, 
foreign exchange rate, credit rating or credit index, or 
other variable; 
 derivative instruments require an initial 
investment smaller than required for alternative types 
of contracts with a similar response to changes in 
market factors; and 
 it is settled at a future date. 
The value of derivative instruments, as defined 
above, are based on the price of an underlying asset 
(Brigham, Daves & Gapenski 1999). These assets 
include: 
 Commodities. 
 Currencies. 
 Stocks.  
 Interest rates (This paper concerns the price 
of a commodity, namely corn) 
Derivative instruments can, furthermore, be 
classified as either futures contracts, forward contracts 
or options contracts. Even though the form and 
terminology of futures contracts and forward contracts 
differ substantially, the fundamental mathematics and 
economics of these derivative instruments remain the 
same (Skerrit 2002). However, this paper concerns the 
futures contract for corn and can be described as an 
agreed-upon price at a certain time in the future (Hull 
2002). According to Petzel (1989), a well-functioning 
futures contract should be general enough in nature to 
apply to a broad range of buyers and sellers. Since 
futures are exchange traded contracts, the following 
characteristics are standardized: 
 The asset-type. 
 The quantity of the asset. 
 The quality of the asset. 
 The future maturity date. 
For the purposes of this paper, it is also 
important to briefly give an overview of price-risk 
management in the futures market. 
 
5 Price-risk management performance of 
stakeholders in the futures market 
 
Price movement and volatility complicates price 
discovery and represents an economic risk to all 
participants. Agricultural producers and processors 
make use of futures prices in forming price 
expectations and production estimates. Therefore, the 
accuracy and effectiveness with which price discovery 
occurs has important social welfare consequences for 
all hedgers in the corn futures market. In addition, soft 
commodity futures markets have become widespread 
investment vehicles among asset managers as a form 
of strategic and tactical asset allocation.  
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The magnitude of price risks can be large and it 
is therefore clear that risk management is worthy of 
attention during research. As such, the effectiveness 
with which market participants are able to accurately 
forecast future price movements in order to mitigate 
the risk of price volatility on their business 
endeavours. This is necessary, as it is the foundation 
on which the proposed risk management methodology 
will be based. 
The most important role-players regarding the 
forecasting of futures price movements are the 
producers, processors, market advisory services and 
speculators. 
 
5.1 Producers 
 
Producers are at the start of the chain and are therefore 
expected to bear the brunt of negative volatility forces 
since their revenue streams are linked to commodity 
prices as a whole. Ever since the deregulation and 
liberalisation of futures markets, producers have been 
exposed to numerous price variations and 
uncertainties. Whereas prices used to be determined 
by subjective government intervention, the liberalised 
futures market now faces a number of price variables 
affecting prices on a continuous and irregular manner.  
US producers identify commodity price risk as 
the single biggest challenge they face, notwithstanding 
the existence of a number of price risk management 
tools at their disposal (Irwin, Good, Martines-Filho & 
Batts 2006). In addition to the high levels of price risk, 
which threaten producers, research suggests that price 
behaviour is the least manageable factor threatening 
producers (Nivens et al. 2002). Coble, Patrick, Knight 
and Buquet (1999) derived their findings from a 
survey conducted among producers in Indiana, 
Mississippi, Nebraska and Texas where they found 
that corn price movement has by far the most potential 
to affect net farm income.  
A general perception exists that producers 
perform poorly in the managing of corn price risk 
(Irwin et al. 2006). This view is supported by Decision 
Commodities (2006) which states that two-thirds of 
producers, on average, hedge themselves in the bottom 
third of the annual price range. A trend determined by 
Jesse (2009), indicated that producers’ hedging 
strategies were not able to exploit high prices during 
the spring and early summer. The subsequent freefall 
in prices from July 2008 as a result of the global credit 
crisis suggests that either few hedging strategies were 
put in place beforehand or strategies lacked the ability 
to capture high price levels. A major obstacle faced by 
producers in hedging grains for future delivery is the 
fact that the extent of risk reduction from futures 
contracting can be miniscule when yield variability is 
high and a negative correlation exists between yield 
and price (Harwood, Heifner, Coble, Perry & 
Somwaru 1999).   
 
 
5.2 Processors 
 
Corn processors have an intrinsic added value in their 
businesses achieved by converting the raw product 
into saleable outputs. Price volatility can have serious 
financial consequences on corn processors and they 
therefore need to follow disciplined and rigorous 
hedging methodologies in order to monitor and control 
price exposure to the market.  
According to Irwin and Good (2009), the most 
important implication of exaggerated price movement 
is the timing of entering into a hedging strategy. The 
recent increase in price volatility had a negative 
impact on processors, stressing market participants 
and institutions beyond the breaking point. Since corn 
used in the production of ethanol and consumed as 
animal feed amounts to 75% of all US corn usage 
(Finnegan 2011), it is important to determine the 
effect of volatile corn prices and extreme market 
movements on these two business sectors.  
 
5.3 Market advisory services 
 
Limited research has been done on the effectiveness of 
recommendations from advisory services. The earliest 
study from Marquardt and McGann (1975) into price 
outlook newsletters suggested that futures prices tend 
to be a more accurate forecaster of prices than either 
public or private newsletters. In 1996, Kastens and 
Schroeder (1996) examined returns achieved from 
implementing strategies recommended by up to ten 
advisory services over an 8-year period, with mixed 
results over different commodities.  
A study by Irwin et al (2009), suggests limited 
and irregular returns in the top-third of the price range 
similar to results achieved by producers without any 
assistance in the marketing of their grains. This 
indicates that market advisory services provide modest 
results at best. In addition, it is determined that 
advisory programmes have only a marginal chance of 
realising returns superior to that of the chosen 
benchmark. The conditional probability of winner and 
loser advisory services provide little evidence that 
future pricing performance can be derived from past 
performance. It is clear that advisory services, either 
individually or as a group, seems to lack the necessary 
expertise to outperform the market. Although 
producers tend to make use of these programmes in 
order to shift the decision-making responsibility from 
themselves, research on the effectiveness of market 
advisory services suggests that the results achieved are 
not sufficient to justify the costs associated with the 
programmes. 
 
5.4 Speculators 
 
Stewart (1934) is credited for his pioneering research 
on the profitability of speculators in the soft 
commodities futures market. In order to determine the 
ability of speculators to consistently outperform the 
Risk governance & control: financial markets & institutions / Volume 3, Issue 1, 2013 
 
 
10 
futures market, he engaged in an analysis of more than 
9 000 speculative accounts over a nine-year period. A 
prerequisite for these trading accounts was that trades 
had to be limited to exclusively grain futures 
positions. The results of the study were somewhat 
concerning, given that close to 75% of all speculative 
accounts lost money. In addition, the average loss on 
the accounts analysed amounted to six times the value 
of the average profit. 
A major risk faced by speculators in the corn 
derivatives market is the formation of speculative 
bubbles as a result of increased speculative buying by 
mutual funds. This implies that the actual price of the 
underlying commodity by far exceeds the fundamental 
value (Masters & White 2008). The main thrust in the 
opposition to the formation of speculative bubbles is 
that large inflows of speculative money allows for 
significant and unwarranted support for commodity 
prices. Once the flow of speculative money is reversed 
by way of liquidation of speculative long positions, 
the bubble bursts and investors are subject to the risk 
of forfeiting all accrued profits and, in extreme cases, 
the starting capital as well (Irwin, Sanders & Merrin 
2009).      
The evidence discussed and presented in this 
section indicates that none of the market participants 
currently holds an edge over the futures market and 
that market volatility is to be blamed for the lack of 
successful hedging and speculative strategies. With 
market volatility expected to increase continuously in 
the future, the difficulty of managing and mitigating 
price risk is expected to grow along with price 
uncertainty.  
 
6 A proposed price-risk management 
methodology 
 
This section will focus on various individual technical 
analysis oscillators, as well as a combination of 
oscillators providing trading signals upon which a 
proposed price-risk management methodology will be 
based.  
 
6.1 Technical analysis 
 
Brown and Jennings (1989) define technical analysis 
as a forecasting method which uses past prices to infer 
private information. This is consistent with the 
definition by Blume, Easley and O’Hara (1994) who 
state that technical analysis is a method through which 
price and volume data are examined with the objective 
of obtaining information regarding future price 
movements. A description very much similar to this 
from Kleinman (2005) suggests that technical analysis 
encompasses research of past and current price action 
with the objective of accurately projecting future price 
action. He states that market technicians believe that 
the single most important factor necessary for price 
forecasting is price action. 
 
6.2 Technical oscillators 
 
Oscillators are indicators which determine when a 
market is trading in overbought or oversold 
conditions. Prices do not move straight up or straight 
down forever without corrective moves. At an 
uncertain time and price level in the future, prices will 
turn, either temporarily or permanently. According to 
Kleinman (2005), a market is said to be overbought 
when the specific oscillator reaches an upper extreme. 
At that moment, the market is deemed too high since it 
is running out of buyers and is therefore about to fall 
under its own weight. Once the oscillator fluctuates at 
a lower extreme, oversold conditions are present. This 
represents a period when the market is running out of 
sellers and prices approach a level at which a bounce 
can be expected.  
 
 
Figure 1. Average monthly corn futures price volatility for period 2000–2009 
 
 
  Source: CME Group (2011) 
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The most common oscillators used by technical 
analysts in the forecasting of prices include the 
relative strength index (RSI) and slow stochastic. 
Whilst the moving average is not recognised as an 
oscillator, it remains an essential forecasting tool 
when futures prices are in a trending phase.  
In order to confirm the trend in the volatility of corn 
futures contracts, the average monthly volatility is 
calculated over the period 2000–2009. The monthly 
average over the ten-year period is determined in 
order to present the researcher with the eventual trend 
for the period under scrutiny. Figure 1 graphically 
illustrates the average monthly corn futures price 
volatility for the period 2000-2009, as well as the 
polynomial trendline. The result supports the findings 
of Goodwin and Schnepf (2000) as well as those of 
Seeley (2009). 
 
6.2 Price risk management methodology 
 
In contesting the notion of the efficient market 
hypothesis, it is proposed that a combination of 
technical analysis and observable market trends can be 
exploited in a manner that will enable the trader to 
achieve returns superior to those offered by the 
market. This section will aim to describe the 
background on the methodology underlying the 
trading strategy. 
For the purposes of this study, the methodology 
was applied to the main CBOT corn delivery month 
(December) over the course of the calendar year (first 
trading day to last trading day of the specific futures 
contract). 
 
6.3.1 Price risk management methodology 
 
The methodology is discussed with reference to 
particular trading dates. 
 
6.3.1.1  1 January – 30 April 
 
For the period 1 January to 30 April, the producer 
(processor) and speculator entered into trading 
transactions once all of the technical indicators had 
been aligned simultaneously in a sell (buy) signal. 
This included the RSI >70% (<30%), stochastic 
indicator >70% (<30%) and the 9-day moving average 
> (<) 21-day moving average. If no trading signal had 
been received before 30 April, the trades had to be 
entered into automatically on 30 April 
notwithstanding the absence of technical signals. 
These transactions included: 
 On the first day a sell (buy) signal was 
indicated, the producer (processor) entered into an at-
the-money long put (call) position. The purpose of the 
methodology was to mitigate price risk. By engaging 
into a long at-the-money option, the risk of adverse 
price movements was addressed while still providing 
the option holder with the force majeure 
characteristic, which eliminated the risk of delivery. 
This trade was entered into specifically before 30 
April as option volatility on average tended to increase 
dramatically from May onward, which resulted in a 
higher option premium.  
 In an attempt to exploit volatility movement, 
a 20% out-of-the money put (call) option was also 
purchased with the objective of selling the option at a 
higher volatility level and therefore option premium 
during the next buy (sell) signal.  
 The long option positions entered into may 
have proved to be quite expensive given the duration 
until option expiration. In an attempt to soften the 
initial option cost, the trader should have exploited the 
time value of options by selling a 20% out-of-the 
money call (put) option. This option trade was 
reversed on the following buy (sell) signal after 
gaining time value. Had the 20% out-of-the money 
option proved to be worthless (i.e. worth $0.01 or 
less), it would have been bought instead as the 
maximum risk equaled possible transaction costs.  
 
6.3.1.2   1 January to last trading day 
 
It was important to monitor the long at-the-money put 
(call) position continuously throughout the course of 
the trading year. On each of the successive sell (buy) 
signals the strike level of the long option was 
compared to the current market price. In the instance 
where the current futures price on a sell (buy) signal 
was trading higher (lower) than the original strike 
price by 10% or more, the long put (call) option had 
been sold and replaced with an at-the-money long put 
(call) option. This is referred to as rolling the option 
up (down) and this took place until option expiration. 
The original at-the-money option was sold only in the 
instance where the option was worth $0.01 or less, 
otherwise it was carried forward to the following 
signal. By doing this, the strategy allowed the user to 
move with the market and continuously achieve higher 
(lower) minimum (maximum) price levels. 
 The 20% out-of-the money put (call) option 
was sold on the following buy (sell) signal, except 
when it was worthless (in this case, it was carried 
forward to the next trading signal). Given the volatility 
trend identified, it was more than likely that this 
would occur at higher volatility levels. In order to 
exploit the higher volatility levels, the option was 
replaced with a short 20% out-of-the money put (call) 
option, only if the option was worth more than $0.01. 
Had the futures price moved beyond the strike of the 
short option, it had to be hedged through delta trading 
of futures contracts. The option was liquidated on the 
next sell (buy) signal. 
 The short 20% out-of-the money call (put) 
option was reversed on the following buy (sell) signal 
after gaining time value. This was done if the option 
was worth $0.01 or less, otherwise it was carried 
forward to the following signal. Had the futures price 
moved beyond the strike of the short option, it had to 
be hedged through delta trading of futures contracts. 
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In the instance where the option was initially 
worthless and as a result a long position call (put) 
option was entered into, the option was reversed on 
the following sell (buy) signal.  
 
6.3.1.3   Option expiration 
 
On option expiration, the producer (processor) ended 
up with one short (long) futures position for every 
long option contract initially entered into.  
The speculator had no positions as the short 
future and long future offset each other. Therefore: 
 If the long put (call) option was in-the-money 
on option expiration, a short (long) futures contract 
would automatically be realised through the exchange. 
If the long put (call) option was out-of-the-money on 
option expiration, the producer (processor) would 
enter into a short (long) futures contract at current 
market prices. The same scenario applied to 
speculators.  
 Had the put (call) option still been open and 
worthless, it would have expired without any addition 
of futures contracts. If the long option was in-the-
money, profit should have been taken by the trader at 
current market levels. If the short option was in-the-
money, it should already have been mitigated by 
means of delta transactions and therefore not impacted 
on the net futures position. 
 Had the short put (call) option still been open 
and worthless, it would have expired without any 
addition of futures contracts. If the short option was 
in-the-money, it should already have been mitigated 
by means of delta transactions and therefore not 
impacted on the net futures position. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Evaluation of risk management 
methodology versus benchmarking 
 
The feasibility and success of the price risk 
management methodology applied on futures prices 
can only be determined once its performance has been 
compared to the returns offered by the market. The 
specific calculation of the market return is an 
important consideration in the evaluation of a strategy. 
The concept underlying the evaluation of the 
performance of a risk management strategy is the 
comparison of net prices achieved by the strategy 
versus the returns offered by the passive market. This 
benchmarking serves as an objective standard of 
performance (Irwin et al. 2006). 
Benchmarking, according to external 
benchmarks, is based upon the efficient-market 
theory. This entails that markets are rational, all-
knowing and that competition among participants in 
the marketplace will immediately eliminate all 
possible arbitrage opportunities available through the 
exploitation thereof (Irwin et al. 2006). For the 
purposes of this study, the benchmark that will be 
used to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
methodology is the average market price for the 
December corn futures contract over the period 1 
January to 30 November. 
 
7.1 Returns achieved versus benchmark 
2000–2009 
 
In order for the proposed price risk management 
methodology to be accepted and therefore to challenge 
and contest the notion of efficient markets effectively, 
the price risk management methodology needs to 
achieve returns superior to that of the chosen 
benchmark, i.e. the average market price, consistently. 
Table 1 reflects a summary of the net returns (after 
adjustment for option costs) achieved by the 
methodology versus the average market price.  
 
Table 1.  Methodology returns vs. benchmark 2000–2009 
 
Year Average market price Long position Short position Speculative profit 
2000 $2.26 $2.18 $2.30 $0.12 
2001 $2.27 $2.08 $2.30 $0.22 
2002 $2.41 $2.28 $2.56 $0.28 
2003 $2.34 $2.21 $2.34 $0.13 
2004 $2.59 $2.50 $2.70 $0.20 
2005 $2.26 $1.92 $2.28 $0.36 
2006 $2.72 $2.34 $3.13 $0.79 
2007 $3.75 $3.64 $3.78 $0.14 
2008 $5.60 $4.09 $5.97 $1.88 
2009 $3.91 $3.02 $4.58 $1.56 
 
The annual long position price level obtained 
through application of the derivative price risk 
management methodology versus the benchmark 
average market price is depicted graphically in 
Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Performance evaluation of methodology: Long position vs. benchmark 2000–2009 
 
 
 
As is evident from the graph, the methodology 
consistently achieved a long position at a price level 
lower than the comparative benchmark after adjusting 
for relevant option costs. As a result, the conclusion 
can be reached that the methodology has a high degree 
of price forecastability through which market 
movement can be exploited. 
Figure 3 illustrates the annual short position 
price level obtained through application of the 
derivative price risk management methodology versus 
the benchmark average market price. The graph 
clearly indicates that the methodology was 
consistently able to achieve a short position at a price 
level superior to that of the comparative benchmark 
average market price, even after subtracting the option 
costs from the returns achieved. Therefore, the 
conclusion can be made that the methodology has a 
high degree of price forecastability by which market 
movement can be exploited.  
 
 
Figure 3. Performance evaluation of methodology: Short position vs. benchmark 2000–2009 
 
 
 
Figure 4 graphically reflects a summary of the 
methodology returns as presented in Table 1. It is 
evident from the illustration that the benchmark 
average market price is outperformed on an annual 
basis by both the long position price level and the 
short position price level. 
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Figure 4. Summary of financial performance of methodology vs. benchmark 2000–2009 
 
 
 
If the conclusion holds that the methodology is 
able to realise a long position price level lower than 
that of the comparative benchmark as well as a short 
position price level higher than that of the comparative 
benchmark, it is obvious that speculative profits 
should be made when simultaneously engaging in a 
long- and short position by using exactly the same 
methodology. This is depicted in Figure 5, which 
confirms an annual short position in excess of the 
annual long position on a consistent basis. Figure 6 
indicates the net speculative profit realised on an 
annual basis after adjusting for option costs.  
 
Figure 5. Summary of long position price level vs. short position price level 2000–2009 
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Figure 6. Speculative profits achieved by means of application of methodology 2000–2009 
 
 
 
7.2 Application of methodology on 
random data sets 
 
In order to obtain scientific credibility and to prevent 
the possibility of data snooping or bias when applying 
the derivative price risk management methodology on 
historical data, a number of data sets are randomly 
drawn after which the methodology is applied in terms 
of the data obtained. A successful application will 
further enhance the feasibility of the methodology and 
provide additional support for ultimately accepting the 
methodology in contesting the efficient market 
hypothesis. 
 
7.2.1 Calculation of random data sets 
 
The price data are gathered by application of the 
random function (in Microsoft Excel) in terms of 
randomly chosen data: 
 The base price used on the first date of 
trading equals $3.00 per bushel (bu). 
 In order to calculate the technical oscillators, 
a daily high, daily low and daily closing price needs to 
be obtained.  
 The daily close is calculated firstly by 
assigning a random price movement of between -
$0.30/bu and +$0.30/bu (limit down to limit up) on 
the closing price of the previous day. 
 The daily low is calculated by randomly 
assigning a trading range of between -$0.30/bu and 
$0.00/bu on the daily closing price already obtained. 
 For the calculation of the daily high, a 
randomly selected value of between $0.00/bu and 
+$0.30/bu is applied in terms of the daily closing price 
already obtained. 
 Once these sets of data have been 
summarised, the methodology is applied in terms of 
the random data in order to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the price risk management methodology in 
contesting the efficient market hypothesis. 
 
7.2.2 Returns achieved through application of 
methodology on random data sets 
 
Table 2 reflects a summary of the net returns (after 
adjustment for option costs) achieved by the 
methodology versus the average market price as 
depicted by the series of random data sets.  
 
Table 2. Methodology returns versus benchmark on random data sets 
 
Sample Average market price Long position Short position Speculative profit 
1 $3.21 $2.35 $4.23 $1.88 
2 $2.20 $0.70 $3.14 $2.44 
3 $4.40 $3.09 $4.51 $1.42 
4 $2.52 $0.45 $2.65 $2.20 
5 $3.04 $0.48 $3.43 $2.95 
6 $3.45 $3.19 $4.45 $1.26 
7 $2.87 $0.91 $4.85 $3.94 
8 $3.89 $3.41 $3.90 $0.49 
9 $2.59 $2.58 $2.90 $0.32 
10 $2.65 $1.15 $2.65 $1.50 
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From these results, it is evident that the proposed 
methodology was able to outperform the relevant 
benchmark as presented by the randomly chosen 
independent data. It is therefore suggested that the 
methodology is indeed capable of successfully 
contesting the notion of efficient markets.  
Of interest though is the impact of a trendless 
market on the application of the methodology. Since 
the randomly chosen data sets are involuntary in 
nature, they do not adhere to a price trend as observed 
over the period 2000–2009 in terms of which the 
methodology is applied. During these ten years, a total 
of 20 observations were made (consisting of long 
positions and short positions) of which only three 
required delta trading in order to offset a short position 
in an option. The 20 observations made in the ten 
randomly chosen data sets required delta trading in 
eleven instances. It can therefore be concluded that 
trendless markets require a trader to delta out short 
options positions in comparison to trending markets 
more frequently.  
 
8 Conclusion 
 
This study indicated that the majority of previous 
research on the subject accepts and confirms the 
validity of the efficient market hypothesis. A literature 
study among producers, processors, speculators and 
market advisory services further enhanced the view 
that market participants are unable to mitigate the risk 
of price movement and subsequently cannot 
outperform the returns offered by the market.  
The proposed price risk management 
methodology aims to create social wealth through an 
increase in profits. This is achieved by creating the 
trading methodology in a manner that does not rely on 
human intervention but rather implies that the art of 
trading should be performed in a routine process as 
stipulated by the methodology. The underlying 
concept of the methodology is to allow the user to 
enter into trades not based on emotion or market 
sentiment, but rather on a trading signal which is 
based on a basic market analysis that does not have to 
incorporate human intervention. Upon implementing 
these trading signals, the user should achieve profits 
superior to the average market return. This 
methodology addresses the problems as highlighted in 
the empirical research regarding the need for a 
strategy, which mitigates risk, incorporates a force 
majeure and provides superior returns. In short, the 
methodology improves decision-making by allowing 
the trader to base trading decisions on an automated 
trading suggestion. 
Since the average market return is outperformed 
on a consistent basis, the efficient market hypothesis is 
contested successfully and previous findings 
supporting the hypothesis should be questioned. Even 
though the view that futures prices already incorporate 
all relevant market information is not questioned, it is 
suggested that a thorough market analysis may allow 
for trading opportunities, which might deliver superior 
results. 
The proposed methodology does not suggest 
being exhaustive in any manner, and similar 
alternative strategies should exist in theory. It does 
however confirm that market participants should be 
able to exploit market movement for their benefit. 
After considering the results of this study, the 
following recommendations are made to assist traders 
in mitigating the impact of price volatility: 
 Increase individual knowledge on derivative 
instruments through thorough education on the 
mathematics underlying futures and options contracts.  
 Support the development of core/satellite 
price risk management strategies which consist of 
trading methodologies based on an indexing strategy. 
 The trading function should in part be 
outsourced to professionals specialising in exotic 
options based on the expectation of achieving above-
average prices. 
 
References 
 
1. Blume, L., Easley, D. & O’Hara, M. 1994. Market 
statistics and technical analysis: The role of volume. 
The Journal of Finance, 49(1):153–181. 
2. Bodie, Z., Kane, A. & Marcus, A.J. 2002. Investments. 
Fifth edition. New York: McGraw- Hill. 
3. Brigham, E.F., Daves, P.R. & Gapenski, L.C. 1999. 
Intermediate financial management. Sixth edition. 
Orlando, FL: The Dryden Press. 
4. Brown, D.P. & Jennings, R.H. 1989. On technical 
analysis. Review of Financial Studies,  2(4):527–551. 
5. CME Group, vide Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
Group. 
6. Coble, K.H., Patrick, G.F., Knight, T.O. & Baquet, 
A.E. 1999. Crop producer risk management survey: A 
preliminary summary of selected data. Information 
Report 99-001, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Mississippi State University, Mississippi 
State, MS.  
7. Decision Commodities. 2006. Education-commodity 
markets. Available from: 
http://www.decisioncommodities.com/education/index
.html [Accessed 14 January 2006]. 
8. Finnegan, J. 2011. Corn price increases tell a story 
about why commodity prices are rising. American 
Century Investments Weekly Market Update, 2 May:1-
3. 
9. Good, D.L., Hieronymus, T.A. & Hinton, R.A. 1980. 
Price forecasting and sales management: Corn, 
soybeans, cattle, and hogs. Available from: 
http://www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/irwin/links_archive_boo
k1.asp [Accessed  18 May 2009]. 
10. Goodwin, B.K. & Schnepf, R.D. 1999. Long-run price 
risk in US agricultural markets. Conference 
proceedings of the AAEA Summer Meetings, 
Nashville, TN. 
11. Harwood, J., Heifner, R., Coble, K., Perry, J. & 
Somwaru, A. 1999. Managing risk in farming: 
Concepts, research and analysis. Agricultural 
Economic Report No. 774. Washington, DC: USDA. 
Risk governance & control: financial markets & institutions / Volume 3, Issue 1, 2013 
 
 
17 
12. Hull, J.C. 2002. Fundamentals of futures and options 
markets. Fourth edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
13. IASB, vide International Accounting Standards Board 
14. International Accounting Standards Board. 2006. 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). 
London. 
15. Irwin, S.H. & Good, D.L. 2009. Market instability in a 
new era of corn, soybean, and wheat prices. Choices, 
24(1):6–11. 
16. Irwin, S.H., Good, D.L., Martines-Filho, J. & Batts, 
R.M. 2006. The pricing performance of market 
advisory services in corn and soybeans over 1995–
2004. Unpublished research project, University of 
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, IL. 
17. Irwin, S.H., Sanders, D.R. & Merrin, R.P. 2009. Devil 
or angel? The role of speculation in the recent 
commodity price boom (and bust). Journal of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics, 41(2):377–391. 
18. Jesse, E. 2009. Status of the Wisconsin farm economy. 
Status of Wisconsin Agriculture: 1–12. 
19. Kastens, T.L. & Schroeder, T.C. 1996. Efficiency tests 
of July Kansas City wheat futures. Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, 21:187–198. 
20. Kleinman, G. 2005. Trading commodities and 
financial futures. Third edition. Upper Saddle River, 
NJ: FT Press. 
21. Marquardt, R. & McGann, A.F. 1975. Forecasting 
commodity prices. Commodity Journal, 10:29–33. 
22. Masters, M.W. & White, A.K. 2008. The accidental 
Hunt brothers: How institutional investors are driving 
up food and energy prices. Available from: 
http://accidentalhuntbrothers.com [Accessed 28 
December 2010]. 
23. Nivens, H.D., Kastens, T.L. & Dhuyvetter, K.C. 2002. 
Payoffs to farm management: How important is crop 
marketing? Journal of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics, 34(1):193–204.  
24. Petzel, T.E. 1989. Financial futures and options. New 
York: Quorum. 
25. Seeley, C. 2009. Seasonal volatility of corn futures 
prices. Unpublished honours thesis, Duke University, 
Durham.  
26. Skerrit, P. 2002. Derivatives. Johannesburg: Peter 
Skerrit. 
27. Stewart, B. 1934. The profits of professional 
speculators. Economic Journal, 44(175):415–433. 
28. Trostle, R. 2008. Global agricultural supply and 
demand: Factors contributing to the recent increase in 
food commodity prices. Available from: 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/WRS0801/WRS
0801.pdf [Accessed 23 May 2009]. 
29. USDA, vide United States Department of Agriculture. 
 
 
